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SUMMARY
Swine origin influenza A/H1N1 virus 
was first detected in Mexico in April 
2009. It thereafter spread to over a 
hundred countries in five continents 
including Africa and was declared a 
pandemic by the WHO. The disease 
was estimated to have caused 18,500 
l a b o r a t o r y - c o n f i r m e d  d e a t h s 
worldwide among millions of infected 
people within the first year. Though 
Africa was late in detecting and 
reporting pandemic H1N1, information 
on the incursion of the virus into Africa 
and i ts  molecular  features  are 
important for  planning control 
measures between countries and to 
understand inter-host and genetic 
relationship of influenza viruses 
detected in Africa. We studied time and 
events of the detection of 2009 
pandemic Influenza A/HIN1 virus in 
Africa and selected viral HA and NA 
gene sequences from the GenBank and 
G I S A I D  d a t a b a s e s .  N u c l e o t i d e 
sequence alignment and construction 
of phylogenetic trees were carried out 
with MEGA version 5 bioinformatics 
software and the neighbor-joining 
ClustalW method with 1000 bootstrap 
replicates. Earliest human cases of 
pandemic H1N1 in Africa were detected 
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by June 2009 in Egypt, Morocco, South 
Africa and later cases in Ghana, Nigeria 
a n d  C a m e r o o n ,  w i t h  v a r y i n g 
phylogenetic clusters. Following cases of 
Influenza A/H1N1 pandemic in humans, 
infections in pigs earlier reported in 
America, Europe and Asia were also 
observed in Cameroon, Nigeria, Togo 
and Kenya, apparently transmitted from 
humans by reverse zoonoses. Adoption 
of an integrated, cross-sectoral and 
transboundary approach to zoonotic 
diseases surveillance and management 
in the context of One-Health in Africa is 
advocated. Africa particularly needs to 
be better prepared to prevent or mitigate 
outbreaks and spread of emerging 
diseases.
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INTRODUCTION
The declaration of a pandemic caused by swine 
origin A/H1N1 influenza virus in 2009 by the 
World Health Organization (WHO, 2009) re-
emphasized the importance of emerging 
infectious diseases in global public health and 
economy. Earlier pandemics of influenza 
occurred in 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2) and 
1968 (H3N2) (Dowdle, 1999; Lina, 2008) but 
none had the devastating effect of 1918 Spanish 
f lu  tha t  was  repor ted  to  have  k i l led 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  5 0  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e 
(Taubenberger, 2006). Although cases of the 
2009 pandemic were mild, the virus spread to 
208 countries and territories infecting over 1 
million people with 18,500 deaths recorded 
within the first year (Akhilesh et al., 2010; 
Dawood et al., 2012). The rapidity with which 
infectious diseases are transmitted and spread 
st
between countries in the 21  century is 
unprecedented. This is partly aided by 
globalization of trade and travels especially 
those involving international aircraft that move 
people and commodities, thereby carrying 
potentially infectious pathogens around the 
world (Kaferstein et al., 1997). 
Swine origin influenza virus subtype A/H1N1 
was first detected in Mexico and it spread across 
all continents (Smith et al., 2009). It took only 
few days from the index case in Mexico before 
the virus was reported in the United States of 
America (USA),  apparent ly aided by 
international travels. Mexico and the USA share 
a very long border with over 600 flights 
between the two countries daily as well as heavy 
road traffic (Muula, 2009). In April 2009, the 
Director General of the World Health 
Organization raised the alert level of the 
influenza pandemic to phase five, an indication 
that the outbreak must be taken seriously 
because of its capacity to spread rapidly to every 
country in the world. Expectedly, within one 
month of circulation it was reported almost 
everywhere in the world except Africa. 
Similarly, the WHO influenza A (H1N1 swine 
flu) update of May 2009 recorded influenza 
H1N1 virus victims in many countries but none 
in Africa. However, before the end of 2009, two 
reports (Archer et al., 2009; CDC, 2009) 
emerged with data on confirmed swine flu cases 
from South Africa and Kenya indicating that the 
virus was circulating in Africa but was not 
reported as readily because of the lack of a 
rigorous surveillance system (Yazdanbakhsh 
and Kremsner, 2009). Based on this knowledge 
and the reports of transmission of pandemic 
H1N1 virus from humans to pigs in other parts 
of the world (Howden et al., 2009; Hofshagen et 
al., 2009; Pereda et al., 2010; Song et al., 2010), 
it is apparent that pandemic H1N1 constitutes a 
potential public health risk in Africa. This study 
was therefore aimed at investigating the 
introduction and spread of pandemic H1N1 
virus in humans and animals in Africa by 
analyzing data  on the molecular  and 
phylogenetic features important for planning 
f u t u r e  i n t e r v e n t i o n s  a n d  p a n d e m i c 
preparedness strategies. The findings may have 
economic, public health and polit ical 
implications for the rest of the world.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We studied time and events of the detection of 
2009 pandemic Influenza A/HIN1 virus in 
Africa as reported in published literature and 
databases. The gene sequences of novel 
A/H1N1 2009 pandemic viruses were retrieved 
from the National Center for Biological 
Information (NCBI) Influenza resources 
w e b s i t e  - 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.gov/genomes/flu/html (Bao 
et al., 2008) and the GISAID website - 
http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/frontend621e1 
(Butler, 2006). We searched the PubMed, 
Google Scholar, Scopus and other databases up 
till May 2015 using the search terms “influenza 
A/H1N1”, “pandemic”, “human”, “swine” and 
countries in Africa to identify articles 
describing pandemic H1N1 cases. One hundred 
and fifteen haemagglutinin (HA) and 75 
neuraminidase (NA) gene sequences were 
selected on the basis of earlier deposits in 
GenBank and GISAID, full or partial gene 
fragments, country of origin and host species. 
Multiple sequence deposits and short fragments 




and missing data were eliminated from the 
dataset (complete deletion option). There were 
a total of 1693 positions in the final dataset. A 
consensus for phylogenetic analysis was built 
by creating an agreement in the data which was 
achieved by deleting positions 1 – 138 and 1069 
– 1752 of the HA gene while positions 1 – 598 
and 1318 – 1410 were also deleted in the 
selected NA gene sequences. Sequences were 
thereafter aligned using MEGA version 5 
bioinformatics software (Tamura et al., 2011) 
while evolutionary history was inferred using 
the Neighbour-Joining method (Saitou and Nei, 
1987).The optimal tree with the sum branch 
length = 0.05397918 was drawn to scale, with 
branch lengths being in the same unit as those of 
the evolutionary distances used to infer the 
phylogenetic trees.
TABLE I: TIMELINE OF REPORTED CASES OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA A (H1N1) IN 
AFRICA
S/N Country Date of Reporting S/N Country  Date of reporting
1 Egypt 2 June, 2009  24 Madagascar  12 August 2009 
2 Morocco 10 June 2009   25 Congo DR  15 August 2009 
3 South Africa 14 June 2009  26 Mozambique  17 August 2009 
4 Cape Verde
 






31 August 2009 
5 Tunisia
 






1 September 2009 
6 Ethiopia
 






10 September 2009 
7 Algeria
 






12 October, 2009 
8 Cote d'Ivoire
 


















29 October 2009 
27 May 2011 
 10 Mauritius
 






29 October 2009 
11 Uganda
 
























December 4, 2009 
14 Libya
 






12 December 2009 
15 Seychelles
 






13 December 2009 
16 Botswana
 






29 December 2009 
17 Zimbabwe
 
















29 January 2010 
19 Namibia
 






2 February 2010 
20 Gabon
 























  22 Ghana 
 











5 August 2009 /20 
January 2010 
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TABLE II: AMINO ACID SUBSTITUTIONS IN THE HA GENE OF SELECTED PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA A/H1N1 VIRUSES FROM AFRICA
Domain data 202 203 220 222 239  240  251  266  289  300  312  332 338 391  
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RESULTS   
Literature search and information gathered 
from gene sequences retrieved from public 
databases revealed that earliest human cases of 
pandemic H1N1 in Africa were reported by 
June 2009 in Egypt, Morocco and South Africa 
with later cases in Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and 
other West African countries (Table I). As at 
December 2011, shortly after the peak of the 
pandemic, 35 countries in Africa officially 
reported pandemic H1N1 to the World Health 
Organization. In all, 18,598 laboratory-
confirmed human cases of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 including 168 deaths were recorded in 
Africa (WHO, 2012). Based on curated data 
from literature, 45 countries in Africa 
experienced pandemic H1N1 outbreaks. Cases 
of the pandemic later subsided, as was also the 
general decline in number of cases reported in 
other parts of the world. Interestingly, a number 
of cases were seen in domestic pigs in countries 
that have had earlier outbreaks of pandemic 
H1N1 in humans. 
A few amino acid substitutions at the HA 
cleavage site between position 200 to 400 were 
observed while fewer substitutions were also 
seen in the antiviral resistance region of the NA 
gene between amino acid position 200 and 450 
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o t o t y p e 
A/California/07/2009 (Table II and III). These 
substitutions were notably at positions 202, 
222, 299 and 240 for the HA gene (Table II) and 
positions 200, 248, 351 and 369 for the NA 
gene. Most isolates from individual countries 
1254
ISSN 0331-3026Meseko et al
clustered together on the phylogenetic tree but 
few countries like Egypt and Ghana had more 
than one cluster (Fig 1). Isolates from Nigeria, 
Togo and Kenya where pandemic H1N1 was 
detected in humans and swine also clustered on 
the phylogenetic tree.
TABLE III: AMINO ACID SUBSTITUTIONS IN THE NA GENE OF SELECTED PANDEMIC 
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DISCUSSION
The index case of pandemic H1N1 was reported 
in Mexico in April 2009 (Smith et al., 2009). 
Few months afterward, Egypt became the first 
country in Africa to report cases of the 
pandemic (Ahmed et al., 2011). This was 
closely followed by reported cases in Morocco, 
South Africa, Cape Verde and Ethiopia while 
the West African countries of Nigeria, Senegal, 
Mali, Chad and Togo detected cases in their 
territories much later (Table I).
According to the World Health Organization, 
the number of deaths reported by its member 
States during the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic 
of 2009/2010 was usually based on laboratory 
confirmation and widely considered a gross 
underestimation because, among other reasons, 
deaths may have occurred without being 
recognized or  tes ted (WHO, 2011a) . 
Disproportionate number of cases and deaths 
resulting from infectious diseases often occur in 
under-developed countries with limited or no 
laboratory capacity for diagnosis. In Africa, 
poor surveillance and documentation with 
ineffective detection in some countries may 
have caused under-reporting of the 2009/2010 
pandemic and resulted in a casualty figure of 
less than 200 compared to the global fatality of 
over 18,500 deaths (WHO, 2011a; Grace et al 
2012; Dawood et al., 2012; Meseko et al., 
2013). However, the wide media attention 
attracted by the pandemic influenza virus 
outbreak improved general awareness and 
encouraged more countries to carry out 
surveil lance for cases part icularly at 
international borders and in hospitals/clinics 
that served as sentinel sites (Dalhatu et al., 
2012).
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Fig 1: Phylogenetic tree based on amino acid sequences of haemagglutinin (A) and neuraminidase (B) genes of 
selected pandemic influenza A/H1N1 strains from Africa
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Molecular sequences obtained from the NCBI 
and GISAID databases of pandemic (H1N1) 
viruses that circulated in Africarevealed certain 
amino acid substitutions,  which were 
significantly different from the prototype 
A/California/07/2009. These include mutations 
at positions 220 and 338 for HA, and positions 
248 and 351 for NA, with potential implications 
for transmission and pathogenicity requiring 
further investigation. One notable mutation was 
D222G observed in the HA gene of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus isolated from a fatal case in 
Tunisia. This substitution was observed in a 47 
year-old man who died after 3 days without 
other subjacent pathologies or any known risk 
factor (Moussi et al., 2012). If this mutant virus 
is transmitted to an animal host, a different 
pathological and evolutionary scenario may 
also be presented. 
Different clusters of the virus on phylogenetic 
trees generated using sequences within and 
between countries indicate a likelihood of dual 
or multiple sources of infection. Interestingly, 
the swine isolate from Nigeria clustered 
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  h u m a n  i s o l a t e s  f r o m 
neighbouring Cameroon and Ghana, and 
another human isolate from Nigeria, suggesting 
a common origin. This is also similar to 
observed clustering of human and swine viruses 
detected in Togo and Kenya (Fig. 1). 
Following cases of pandemic influenza 
A/H1N1 virus in humans, infections were also 
reported in pigs in America, Asia and Europe 
(Smith et al., 2009). In Africa, Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Kenya and Togo with earlier cases of 
H1N1 in humans also reported pandemic H1N1 
in free-range and commercial pigs (Bao et al., 
2008; Njabo et al., 2012; Meseko et al., 2014; 
Ducatez et al., 2015). According to Peiris et al. 
(2012), cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 in 
pigs could have originated from humans. This 
phenomenon of reverse zoonoses is possible in 
any of the countries and at the human-animal 
interface where livestock farming is carried out 
with regular intermingling between people and 
animals (Howden et al., 2009; Nelson & 
Vincent, 2015). 
The index case virus of the influenza (H1N1) 
2009 pandemic, described as a lineage of swine 
influenza virus, has been described as a product 
of reassortment among avian, swine and human 
variants of influenza virus (Garten et al., 2009). 
Intermingling of different species of domestic 
animals with each other and with human 
handlers in poor biosecurity settings favours 
such reassortment. Thus, global pandemic 
preparedness efforts need to take into 
cognizance this interplay at the human-animal 
interface.
At the beginning of the outbreak, the virus was 
initially called swine influenza, which resulted 
in objectionable dispositions to pigs in some 
countries. However, FAO/OIE/WHO tripartite 
committee on pandemic influenza was quick to 
modify the description of the novel virus from 
init ial  swine influenza to the current 
nomenclature, influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 
(WHO, 2011b). This was also to allay initial 
confusion that the virus was directly transmitted 
to humans from pigs at the time of the outbreak 
in April 2009. Nevertheless, authorities in some 
countries like Egypt already ordered the 
slaughter of all pigs, a directive that may not be 
without religious and political influence (ABC 
News, 2009; Kerr, 2010). The adverse 
economic consequence of mass culling of 
livestock in disease control efforts would no 
doubt jeopardize livelihood if not carefully 
implemented. 
CONCLUSION
The next epidemic or pandemic of influenza 
may be caused by a reassortant of human 
seasonal influenza, pandemic or classical swine 
influenza virus. Poor surveillance, detection 
and disease reporting that are major problems in 
Africa may worsen emerging diseases scenario. 
This may also jeopardize food security and 
endanger public health,and should therefore be 
viewed more seriously by relevant authorities in 
the continent in the context of One-Health.
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